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TALKING ABOUT RELIGION IN THE
LANGUAGE OF THE LAW: IMPOSSIBLE
BUT NECESSARY
JAMES BOYD WHITE*
In speaking to this conference about religion and law I am in a
decidedly peculiar position, for it may be that every one of you has
thought longer and harder about the relation between these two forms
of life than I have. When Scott Idleman first asked me to talk to you, I
explained that I was no expert, to put it mildly, and that the most that I
could offer would be the reflections of a neophyte. He said that this was
fine-perhaps he was just desperate for a speaker; perhaps he thought
that it might be helpful to have a fresh look from the outside at some of
the difficulties and possibilities of thought in this field.
Whether I can achieve such a thing is of course a real question; but I
do want to say that I am grateful to him and to you for the opportunity,
since in thinking about this topic for this occasion I have learned a great
deal. Perhaps you can take what I say as the observations of a visitor to
a terrain that is familiar to you.
As my title suggests, what has struck me most in these reflections is
the simplest and most obvious fact, namely the enormous difficulty of
talking about religion in the language of the law. In what follows I shall
try to explain what seem to me to be some of the reasons for this,
beginning with some that will be highly familiar to you, relating to the
history and structure of our Constitution, then going on to some that are
more speculative in nature. I will conclude by asking how, in light of
these circumstances, courts ought to think about questions of religion,
particularly in the context defined by the First Amendment. My aim is
* Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Professor of
Classical Studies, The University of Michigan.
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not to propose rules of law, but to make some suggestions about the
attitudes with which judges might approach these questions.
I.
The most obvious problem to me as a newcomer to the field is the
traditional one of understanding and defining its central term,
"religion." It is not possible for the law simply to avoid the use of the
word, for it appears in the First Amendment, which is the ruling text in
the field, and also, in one form or another, in important statutes, such as
the Military Selective Service Act, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, state and federal tax codes, and the like.' We must use it and must
define it. Yet deciding what meaning it should be given is most
problematic, particularly with respect to the First Amendment, where it
must have a very different meaning for us now from any that was
current in the population to which that text was originally addressed. At
that time it would have referred, I suppose, mainly to different branches
of Christianity, indeed to different branches of Protestantism, of which
most of the population had personal experience. Today, by contrast, it
would include an astonishing variety of beliefs and practices (while
presumably excluding others). By what criteria, then, can "religion"
possibly be defined, and the line between it and "nonreligion" be
drawn?
To make matters worse, some of the purposes of the First
Amendment, upon which we would naturally hope to call in giving
meaning to its central term, are, as Steven Smith in particular has
shown, unavailable to us. The idea, for example, that the prohibition of
"establishment" is meant to protect the church itself against the
infection of the state is hard for us to entertain as a polity, however
appealing it may still be to some people personally; and much the same
could be said of the idea that "free exercise" is important not just as an
aspect of individual autonomy but for a theological reason, that such
1. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170 (c)(2)(B) (1994) (providing charitable deduction for gifts to
entities "organized and operated exclusively for religious.., purposes"); Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1983) (defining "exercise of religion" as "the exercise
of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution"); Military Selective Service Act
of 1948, Pub. L. No. 759, 62 Stat. 604, 612 (exempting those who "by religious training and
belief' are "conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form"). The statute goes
on to say: "Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human
relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code." Id. at 613. The reference to a "Supreme Being" was dropped
in 1967. Pub. L. No. 90-40,81 Stat. 104.
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freedom is necessary to the full realization of the Christian life.2
What one might call the federalism aspects of the First Amendment
make it still harder for us to retrieve and use any original meanings.
The Establishment Clause of course originally worked only at the
federal level, preserving the rights of the states to continue such
religious establishments as they had, of which many people presumably
approved. Likewise the Free Exercise Clause left existing state
restrictions in place, and these must again have been thought by many to
be good and valuable. Among other things, all this makes the
"incorporation" of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth
theoretically more difficult than is, say, the Fourth, for which there were
widespread state analogues. And it means that the widespread
opposition of our day to all signs of religious establishment at every
governmental level, among academics at least, and the related idea that
free exercise is to be regarded as an aspect of autonomy in a secular
state, are harder to root in the constitutional past than some other
features of our discourse. Their authority must rest on other grounds.
By contrast with the eighteenth century, today the Free Exercise
Clause can trigger claims of the widest variety, including not only
virtually every formal religion known in the world but also private
beliefs and sentiments. What is more, this sense of religious pluralism is
I think generally, though certainly not universally, approved. Our
official position seems to be that it is a fine thing for us, as it was for
Gibbon's Rome, that every imaginable religion be present and
tolerated:
The deities of a thousand groves and a thousand streams
possessed in peace their local and respective influence; nor could
the Roman who deprecated the wrath in the Tiber deride the
Egyptian, who presented his offering to the beneficent genius of
the Nile .... Rome gradually became the common temple of her
2 See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1965); STEVEN D. SMITH,
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (1995). You can look at it still in another way. For example, one clergyman of my
acquaintance thought that the separation of church and state required him to suppress or
deny any political views, on the grounds that to do otherwise would impair his capacity to
minister to his congregation, which was not surprisingly divided on such issues.
3. For the view is that by the end of the eighteenth century "Americans had achieved a
broad consensus with regard to Church and State," namely that "government should impose
no religious belief, and that within the boundaries of law every person was entitled to the free
exercise of religion." See Thomas Curry, Church and State in Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Century America, 7 J. L. & RELIGION 261, 269 (1989).
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
subjects; and the freedom of the city was bestowed on all the
gods of mankind.4
But it raises the question why we approve of this variety, if we do; is
it for the reasons Gibbon with fatal irony attributes to the Romans?
"The various modes of worship which prevailed in the ancient world
were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosophers as
equally false; and by the magistrates as equally useful. And thus
toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but even religious
concord."5
II.
I have elsewhere argued that one can think of every act of judicial
interpretation as a kind of translation, necessarily imperfect, from one
world to another, one mind to another.' The familiar but deep changes
in our world and in our law that I have just sketched out make the act of
translation involved in interpreting the constitutional word "religion"
exceedingly difficult.
But there are additional circumstances that make it difficult to talk
sensibly about religion in the law, the most formidable of which are not
contingent upon constitutional history and structure but reside more
deeply in the nature of religious experience. Even without the problems
of history and original intention which so plague our readings of the
First Amendment, that is, we would still face serious difficulties in
speaking in legal terms about religion, and it is to these that I wish to
draw attention.
Here I am concerned not only with defining religion-which might in
a rough way be done from the outside, by the use of more or less
objective criteria, such as a stated belief in a Supreme Being, the use of
ritual and sacred space, the existence of a class of persons set aside for
the religious life, and so on-but with understanding it. I do this on the
premise that understanding is in fact necessary to the inescapable duty
of definition, especially in close cases.
A.
My own sense is that in the culture of academics and intellectuals, in
4. See EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 11, 14
(Harcourt, Brace, & Co. 1960) (1932).
5. Id. at 11.
6. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM 215-55 (1990).
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the university and on the pages of journals, including in the law-in the
culture defined by the expectations you and I bring to this very
conference-it has proven impossible to speak in any very satisfactory
way about religion and religious belief.7 Religion has not been, for
example, a common topic of conversation on any of the faculties of
which I have been a member. I assume the reason is that people think
that little or nothing can be said about religious experience that makes
sense in the common language of our present intellectual life. The
journals that seek to bridge the religious and the secular seem to me not
to do a very good job of it, and, based on my casual exposure to them, I
think much the same can be said of many of the works of theology that
seek a wide audience." To turn to mass culture, there we do hear public
evocations of religious sentiment or belief, often by politicians, but this
does not define a conversation in which I would much want to
participate.
As I hear them, in fact, the tones in which religion is commonly
spoken of in our world, including in the law, are mainly sentimental; or
patronizing; or insulting; or fearful; or threatening; usually not notably
comprehending or really respectful. I do not mean that this is anyone's
fault, but I do think that there is now a deep disjunction between
religious experience and public language of a kind that makes it most
difficult to talk sensibly about religion in our common discourse.
This disjunction can exist at the level of the individual person as well
as that of the society as a whole. To take my own experience as an
example, if I may, when I try to write or speak about my own religious
experience I find that I seem to inhabit two worlds, two languages, in
one of which I can speak about these matters intelligibly, in the other
not at all. It is as though I speak Polish as well as English, and an
English speaker---or the English-speaking side of myself-asks me to
reproduce in English what I say or think in Polish, and it cannot be
done. What makes sense in one place makes no sense in the other. This
is true whichever way I attempt the translation: My religious experience
makes no sense in one of my languages, and in the other the claims of
7. I do not mean this as a criticism of scholarship about the law of religion-
constitutional or otherwise, which seems to be of a generally high quality, but simply to say
that when it comes to representing religion in our common speech, none of us knows how to
do this very well.
8. And of course there are other theological works available of the highest quality. See,
e.g., DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE
CULTURE OF PLURALISM (1981).
1998]
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the state and law simply disappear
That there should be such a gap between religious and other ways of
talking should not be surprising, since there is much about religion, at
least in the forms I know it, that is inherently ineffable or transcendent
or mysterious. Think of what moves a people to build a cathedral, for
example, or to make religious paintings or music: a need to do
something, say something, that cannot be said or done in words. If you
could do it in words, you would, and save all that trouble.0
9. Imagine a conversation in which someone skeptically asks me whether I "believe in
God." I cannot begin to answer such a question unless it already makes sense to the person
asking it, which usually it does not. Often the question really is, "Are you some kind of
fool?" or "Do you insist upon asserting something I do not understand?" In such a case, I
could perhaps best respond in this way: "Not in your sense of 'God,' nor in your sense of
'believe,' nor indeed (as I shall suggest below), in your sense of 'I.'
10. There are two apparent authorities with my position that I would like to address
here. First, there is a question as to whether any experience at all, not just religious
experience, is "expressible" in language, or, more precisely, what we mean when we say that
our experience is expressible.
Think of one's experience of love, for example, or fear, or the beauty of a landscape, or
moral revulsion. Is this experience expressible in words? In a sense of course not, or not
wholly. We talk and talk about these things but do not express them, or not adequately, and
much of our talk about them circles around that fact, sometimes consciously, sometimes not.
On the other hand, there have been and still are cultures in which at least some people
feel that their religious experience is expressible in language, perhaps more expressible than
anything else. "Do you accept Jesus as your personal savior?" is a question that would not
make sense to some people, but it does to others, as does the answer. In fact, as a friend
pointed out to me, what in the history of the world has been talked about more than religion?
I still want to say, however, that religious experience is ineffable in a way that other
experiences are not. Part of what I refer to is the boundedness of religious discourse. You
may say that your experience is expressible in your language, and others in your community
may agree, but your expression does not come across to those outside the community defined
by your language. When I speak of love and pain and anger, I do so on the assumption that
any speaker of the English language may be able to connect to what I say, for I assume that
each of us has had versions of these experiences. In religion, the particular discourse defines
a much more sharply bounded world. When I speak the language of Islam or Christianity, I
have no expectation that anyone outside of my group will understand me. In this sense,
religious experience may indeed be expressible, but only within a rather clearly defined
community defined by the language in which I speak. For purposes of modem American
law, this means that religious experience really is ineffable, for there is no common language
of religion to which the law can try to relate.
All this is to accept the claim that one's religious experience is expressible in the
language of one's religion. Obviously, I cannot disprove such a thing, but I do have doubts
about it. For one thing, it seems to me of the essence of religion that it carries us to the edge
of human understanding and beyond it. At its deepest, religion is in fact about the limits on
human life and the human mind, and this makes it inherently inexpressible. For another, in
my experience when a believer is pushed he tends either to repeat what seems to me the
formulas of belief or to recede into a (perfectly appropriate) silence. Perhaps, then, these
formulas do not so much express belief in any real way as give the shared illusion of
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Religion is not only a system of ideas or propositions, that is, but a
mode of life; one of its functions seems to be to carry us to the edge of
the circle of ordinary understanding and beyond it. It is not surprising
that we have a hard time talking about religion in the language of our
common intellectual culture, then, for religious experience is difficult to
talk about in any language at all. Augustine defined the conflict as one
between faith and reason: faith cannot be reduced to reason, or it would
not be faith; but faith cannot destroy reason either, which is one of the
distinctive gifts of humanity. How can these two capacities inhabit the
same mind?
Or the same public world? For as I say, this incompatibility presents
a deep problem for our law, which commits itself to protecting religion
in some situations and restricting it in others. What place can there be
in our world, then, for these two incompatible ways of thinking, of
talking, and of being in the world?12 It would be tempting to say that
expression. For what do you really know about what the language of belief means to a fellow,
believer until you have spoken in some other way about it? Another way to think of this is
not in terms of "expression" at all, but in terms of gestures. Here, intelligibility is less a
matter of understanding what a person's experience is than knowing how to respond to him.
The Quakers come as close to talking meaningfully about their religious experience as
anyone I know. Their success lies partly in the fact that they have no formulas of belief,
partly in the often expressed consciousness that what they wish to say or speak about really
lies beyond language. So they are silent.
11. See, e.g., Augustine of Hippo, The Advantage of Believing, in CLASSICAL
STATEMENTS ON FAITH AND REASON 22 (L. Miller ed., 1970).
12. The split I speak of here is a feature of our contemporary culture, not of all cultures,
nor of all periods of our own. There have been times in which religion and law were closely
connected, even identified: The Hebrew Bible, for example, is in large part a body of law,
and in medieval Christian thought, running up through such writers as Richard Hooker, one
can find a vision of the world that incorporates both human and divine law, and establishes a
relation between them. Islam, of course, would provide another example.
But in America, our dominant conception of law: the law is whatever a properly
constituted political body declares it to be is severely positivist. Insofar as appeals to higher
or deeper authorities are recognized, they take the form of appeals within the law itself, to
constitutional law, or to what we call moral or political philosophy. Our state and our
dominant intellectual culture-the culture of our leading universities and colleges, and our
leading journals-alike seem to be deeply secular in commitment. The First Amendment is
naturally and properly read as institutionalizing this understanding. As I say in the text, it
cannot avoid the task of defining "religion," and this leads to an effort to understand it, an
effort that our cultural circumstances make extremely difficult. Compare John H. Garvey,
Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 798 (1996) (arguing
that "religion is a lot like insanity"); with Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and
Disbelief, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1873,1879 (1994) (pointing out that once a conversation between
a believer and a non-believer shifts to include the invocation of specifically religious grounds
for judgment or action, "it is actually hard to figure out where the conversation might go
next"). Professor Levinson, understandably resists the claim that he should somehow cherish
views that "from [his] own perspective, just do not make sense." Id. at 1881.
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
"religion" is for the individual and the private, "rationality" for the
public and the law; but this is impossible, for in our system at least
"religion" must be defined by the law, and how is that to be done
without some understanding of it, or of its many forms?
B.
I shall argue that the wisest position for the law to take is a
recognition that it cannot understand or represent religious experience
with anything like fullness or accuracy, and then suggest some forms
that this recognition might take. But first I want to say something more
about the difficulty of representing religious experience in the secular
languages of our world, including the law. This difficulty arises not only
from the peculiar history of the First Amendment and from the
ineffable nature of religious experience, as I have just suggested, but
also from the nature of our own ways of talking about that experience,
our own habits of mind. I think that religion is often imagined among
us, that is, in misconceived ways that tempt us to believe that we can in
fact understand and represent it; this leads us to make the effort, and
then to be puzzled and frustrated and perhaps angry when we fail.
In describing this phenomenon, I do not mean to speak with any
authority other than my own experience. I shall be reporting on
conversations engaged in and overheard, from college days to the
present; on books and articles read; on attitudes I myself have picked up
in the process, and the like, all offered to you as something with which
you can compare your own experience.
Here is the image of religion (I think deeply Protestant in nature) to
which I have been repeatedly exposed. Religion at heart consists in
something called "belief"; this belief is arrived at by an individual, in
whatever ways seem best to him; the object of this belief is a set of
propositions, usually about a Supreme Being, sometimes about a set of
beings superior to the human; this being (or beings) issues commands to
human beings, who are threatened with punishment, often eternal
punishment, if they fail to comply; and the life of religion consists in
large part of obedience to these commands. 3
13. This model shows up in a lot of casual speech-both in the law and out of it-and
with particular force in the conscientious objector cases. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). It is sometimes used to explain the
free exercise protections, on the grounds that one who faces eternal damnation for doing
what is required of him by law will simply not do it; he is not himself subject to deterrence
and is thus, on the grounds that make deterrence fair, not a proper object for punishment to
deter others. See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR
[Vol. 81:177
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Let me consider the elements of this view one at a time, in a slightly
different order.
First, the view of religious belief as essentially propositional. This is
one source of the difficulty of translation I refer to above, because the
reduction of religion to a set of "propositions believed in" invites us to
think that one language can incorporate the other, or that effective
translation between them is possible, and this in turn generates
misunderstanding and frustration. You say that you believe that the
Great Otter created the universe by hatching an egg; an expectable
response is that your beliefs are entitled to toleration, but not in any real
way to respect, for who among the rest of us could believe such a thing?
Or that if eagle feathers are not collected from certain canyons, the rains
will never come? Or that each grove and stream has a deity of its own?
Or that in the beginning God created heaven and earth? "Such
propositions simply have no place in the language I speak," someone
might understandably respond.
To frame the center of a religion as a set of beliefs cast in
propositional form is implicitly to treat them like facts, or like theories
subject to verification, and thus to encourage the view that they should
be able to take their place among the propositions affirmed by our
general culture, including the law. This of course proves impossible. It
makes the act of translation seem more feasible than in fact it is. The
view of religion as propositional in this way trivializes it into the object
of patronization, or demonizes it into the object of fear-you believe
that the Koran is the literal word of God dictated to the Prophet by an
angel?
It is important to say that the view of religious belief as propositional
is not eccentric. It is supported by at least two tendencies in our culture.
One is the Christian tradition, which has focused so much attention on
the Creed, the articles of faith that believers affirm and over which the
Christian community has frequently divided, often to the point of war.
The other is the contemporary secular assumption, deep in our shared
theory of knowledge and language, that real thought takes the form of
propositions, the utterance of assertions about the way the world is.
These propositions are not language-bound, it is often thought, but are
translatable into any language whatever; this is in fact necessary if we
are to claim, as many want to do, that our knowledge is universal, that
what makes sense here will make sense anywhere. (Compare our
insistence that foreign regimes become "democratic" so far as possible.)
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 67-69 (1995).
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This is the image of thought and language that animates most science
and most modem philosophy; it is the understanding out of which the
great majority of academic books and articles are written.
These two traditions, the Christian credal one and that of modem
analytic discourse, combine to teach us that "religious belief" means the
affirmation of certain propositions. What else could it be? In the
context defined by the first of these traditions, the Christian one, the
conversation often (but not always) understandably stops with the
affirmation-we now know that you are one of us, and that is what
matters. In the second context, the secular one, the affirmation of
religious belief framed as a set of propositions is taken as an automatic
invitation to argument, and argument in a language in which these
propositions already make no sense. 4
But-still taking Christianity as my example-if you read the
Gospels, especially Mark and John, you will find that Jesus does not ask
his disciples or others to sign on to a set of propositions about the world
which they are to assert as true. Belief for him is not propositional, nor
is it a watered down version of scientific knowledge. Rather, he asks
them to "believe in me": belief in a person, not a set of sentences.
When he does utter sentences, as in his parables, they are often knotty,
hard, paradoxical, puzzling-problems of thought and spirit, not
propositions. And the word that is translated "believe," pisteuein, has a
primary meaning of "trust." What is asked is not acquiescence in
certain statements about the world, but something very different, a kind
of pledging or commitment of the self to another. Much the same is
true, I think, of the God of the Hebrew Bible.
If religious belief is not really propositional, what is it and how is it
to be thought about? Suppose that instead of looking for the root of
religious belief in propositions affirmed or denied we looked to the
14. As to which of these traditions is the stronger I have no opinion; but it is worth
remembering that the credal tradition began before our contemporary view of language and
reason had come into existence, and that we may therefore be systematically misreading them
if we assume that creeds were written on modem assumptions. The Creed might be
understood, for example, not as a set of propositions, but as something else entirely, as a kind
of ritual. Or the Creed might be understood from another perspective as a record of the
issues that have divided this community in the past and of the way they were resolved. At
one point, for example, it mattered whether the Holy Ghost was of the "same substance"
with the Father and Son, or only "of like substance:" This is the famous "homoousian"
versus "homoiousian" dispute of which Gibbon made so much. The Creed tells those in the
western church how they resolved that dispute and they continue to affirm that resolution,
even though the issue is, so far as I know, not real to anyone. What is real is the tradition of
which it is part, the sense of connectedness to another world through this language. This is an
example of talk which makes no sense outside this context, but in it a great deal.
[Vol. 81:177
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religious practices that people engage in and asked what these practices
seem to mean. Jaroslav Pelikan, in The Vindication of Tradition, takes
such a line-I think it is more Catholic than Protestant in character-in
speaking of Christianity when he says that what really defines the
Christian community is the Eucharist, the gathering together to share
the mystic meal."5 This is what Christians have done, somewhere in the
world every day, for two thousand years. The language of the Creed,
like the language of theology more generally, is secondary not primary.
To speak for the moment from inside this community, as Pelikan does,
one might say that our creeds are our highly imperfect attempts to
explain to ourselves what it is that we are doing; we make and repeat
them knowing that they will be imperfect, incomplete, distorted. The
life of the church is the life of community and ritual, not the Creed in
which we try to explain and order that life. Not propositions, but
practices, should be the focus of attention of someone seeking to
understand the meaning of this religion. 6
C.
This brings me to a second element of the common image of religion
15. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 48-49 (1984).
16. I speak in the text at times as though law were itself a system of propositions on the
model of modem analytic philosophy. Yet, as I and others have elsewhere argued at length,
that is in fact a most incomplete view of law-which is full of metaphor, verbal and social
action, narrative, authority, the management of social relations, and so forth. It is also true
that, despite certain appearances, the law is not in the usual sense a logical system-that is, a
system in which particular conclusions are reached by deduction from more general
propositions.
Here is an example of an apparently logical statement in the law: "A contract exists
where there is an offer, acceptance, and consideration; here there is offer, acceptance, and
consideration; therefore, this is a contract." This apparently logical structure has the function
of providing, by agreement among the parties or decision of the judge, a statement of the
issues in the case-Is there an offer, acceptance, or consideration?-or a statement of their
resolution. But for the lawyers each term is open to argument; none has a fixed meaning; the
real question in the case is how each is to be defined. That is a question to which the logical
structure itself does not speak and to which all kinds of other material, not in principle
determinable ahead of time, may be relevant.
The main force of logic in law, in addition to providing an armature for argument and
thought of the kind I have just described, is essentially negative. You can always attack
another if he asserts contradictory things. A lot of energy is normally spent protecting
oneself against such a charge and trying to make it against one's adversary.
Yet, all this being said, it remains true that much of law does take the form of the
assertion of propositions, as commands, as descriptions of prior authority, or as
argumentative conclusions. Of particular relevance to us, in the trial of a case a witness's
testimony will normally be reduced to propositions, which must in turn be related by
standards of relevance to the propositions one is trying to prove.
1998]
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with which I began, namely the idea of "belief" itself, for when we focus
on practice rather than proposition the question of belief becomes much
more problematic. Let me give a minor example: I have some friends
who used to organize a Christmas carol sing each year, usually inviting
much the same group of people to come. The husband who organized
the sing and many of the guests were not in any way Christian, including
by upbringing. I do not know, but I believe, that if you had asked all
fifty people at this sing whether they believed in the divinity of Jesus,
that perhaps two or three at most might have said yes, and not many
more would have identified themselves as Christian in any way. This
was a Christmas carol sing for non-believers.
But was it really? Could it have been? I listened to the carols that
to me were sacred music and asked why they were being sung by people
who "did not believe." Would an anthropologist say that they did not
believe? Or would she speak instead of the extraordinary diffusion of
belief, albeit in a diluted form? Suppose the singers were asked not
whether they "believed" but whether it was important to them that
Jesus had lived: what would they say? (What would the world be like if
he had not?) Were they not in a real way celebrating the birth of this
child who transformed the world?
I do not mean that my friends were closet Christians, or Christians
without knowing it. But I don't think that the explanation one of them
gave, that "I just like the music," quite works either. None of us would
sing Nazi songs, no matter how appealing we thought the tunes were.
What I do mean to suggest, and all I mean, is that the nature and
boundaries of belief are harder to trace out or define, including for a
"believer," than we may think.
Compare the practice of the Christmas tree, which apparently has
Druidic or at least pre-Christian roots. Is the family that buys such a
tree and brings it into the house, decorating it with lights and baubles,
really expressing some dim animistic belief in the sacredness of the tree,
even worshipping it? And: are the lights and fires of Christmas calls for
the return of the sun? As one who does have a Christmas tree each
year, I think it would be difficult and in an important way dangerous to
deny these beliefs, enacted as they are in our practices. I think here of a
remark attributed to Plutarch, that it was the religious practices that
they least understood to which the ancient Greeks adhered most
stoutly.7
17. TIM PARKS, AN ITALIAN EDUCATION 160 (1995).
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To expand the circle still farther, one could find the religious
impulse, or a part of it, expressed in activities not normally thought of as
religious at all, from Freudian psychoanalysis to market economics to
fly-fishing, wherever people try to organize all of their experience, and
claim meaning for it, by reference to a single language or practice or
attitude. Norman MacLean's The River Runs Through It, for example,
begins with the famous sentence, "In our family, there was no clear line
between religion and fly fishing." This is partly a joke, of course, and
there is a lot of sentimental talk about fly fishing with which one would
want to have nothing to do, but I think it is also one aim of the book to
show how this sentence could be true.
On the other hand, it is easy to overstate belief as well as understate
it. Think of a culture in which large numbers of people engage in
certain religious practices. Could you infer from this a subjective state
of "belief?" We often talk as though everyone in the Middle Ages in
the west was a devout believer. Can that have been? Or think of the
study of ancient Greek religion, often represented as a system in which
the Athenians, say, "believed." How can we know such a thing? What
can we mean by it? Does the fact that Homer or Euripides used gods as
characters mean that he believes in them, or that he did not?
Think in this context of Santa Claus, in whom none of us believes.
We all know that he is a mythical figure. Yet many of us who celebrate
Christmas do speak to our children of Santa Claus. If we do not, we
think we might do them an injury by depriving them of an important
source of experience and meaning, of magical love and generosity. We
would become Gradgrinds, thinking that the fictions we call "the facts"
alone have value. Actually in many homes there comes a time when the
children "know" that Santa Claus does not exist, but the parents still
want to talk as if he did, and want the kids to talk that way too, and they
comply, humoring us. At such a moment it is the parents, not the
children, who are insisting upon belief in this figure that none of them in
another sense believes in at all. But in talking about him as we do we
make him real, emotionally and actually real; we expect him to come,
and we see the evidence that he has. So too in the law: in talking in a
certain way about the Constitution we make it real; in talking to a judge
in a certain way we make him or her a judge, not merely a person with a
cushy political job; and these transformations are real, as real as
anything we know, in a sense the proper object of belief.18
18. Compare Claude Levi-Strauss, The Sorcerer and his Magic, in STRUCTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 167-85 (1963). See generally PAUL STOLLER, IN SORCERY'S SHADOW: A
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Maybe the truth is that what we call religious experience is a
dimension of human life to which some people are deeply given or
adapted, by nature or training, others little or not at all; a dimension like
music or sport, in which some people or cultures have great gifts, others
much smaller ones, and that these gifts are not well described as
"beliefs."
D.
I shall speak much more briefly to the third assumption of the model
given above, namely that belief is a matter of individual choice. While
this view may be right as a matter of law and politics, it misstates the
actual experience of most people. Obviously there is no culture-free
place from which one can select the religion of one's choice-we are all
made by our prior experience-and in a deep way religion is often
familial and communal, not only in its practices but in its origins. Of
course people do adopt new religions, or convert, but for many people I
think religious practices are part of their sense of belonging to a
particular family, a particular world, in which they have meaning of a
particular and untranslatable kind.
Likewise, the assumption that religion involves belief in a Supreme
Being who issues commands, enforced by sanctions, perhaps eternal
ones, corresponds with only some kinds of religious experience. There
are religious people who have no belief in a Supreme Being at all-
Buddhists and some Quakers, for example, not to mention individual
members of churches that have an official belief the person does not
share.
More important, for many the heart of religion is not a set of
commands but a set of enablements: These people are moved by hope
and desire, not fear, by a sense of fulfillment, not restraint. And for
many the issue of eternal or extra-temporal sanctions is simply not part
of their imagined space: the consequence they fear is the desiccation of
life, not externally imposed punishment. Of course there is much in
Judaism and Christianity alike to support such an image, but it is
drastically incomplete. This image omits for example the desire to do
what is right, the wish to be in harmony with another, and the idea that
the greatest punishment is not punishment at all, but loss of connection.
One could go on in this vein at great length, drawing upon
testimonies of saints and mystics and ordinary people too, all to the
MEMOIR OF APPRENTICESHIP AMONG THE SONGHAY OF NIGER (1987).
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effect that religious experience cannot in the end be adequately
reflected in the common languages of our present culture, including the
law.
To what kind of understanding might such work ultimately lead us?
Perhaps it could be expressed in an analogy. Suppose that in our culture
music were for many people the ground of life: to listen to it, to make it,
to dance to it, this is what they lived for. But of course there are many
different kinds of music, with different instruments, different tones and
feelings; different musical worlds, ranging from plainsong to punk.
There are naturally tensions among the various musical communities,
sometimes leading to violence-for, as I say, music is what people build
their lives upon. Now suppose a new nation is created, one in which it is
wisely thought that people should be free to practice their own music
without interference from the state except upon very good grounds, and
that the state itself should not promote one school of music over
another or perhaps even music itself. The question would arise as it
does now with religion: how is music to be defined and understood?
What is to one person or group resonant and meaningful is to another
an abomination; and some musicians of course produce work that
deeply challenges accepted norms.
How under these circumstances could music be spoken of by the
law? Not in terms of propositions or beliefs or commands; only in terms
of the kinds of significance claimed by people for their practices. The
way of dealing with the intranslatability of music into other terms would
be to grant that fact, and to ask other questions, about the meaning of
music in the lives of people practicing it.
To turn briefly to what such a view of religion might mean, one
could conclude from it that courts addressing free exercise claims should
attend rather less to the person's religious "beliefs," stated in
propositional terms-for those propositions can in many cases do very
little to carry the nature of the life and conviction into the language of
the law-and rather more to the nature of those beliefs as they are
experienced by the claimant. The central question would ultimately be
that of the sincerity and depth of the person's commitment. This is the
direction in fact taken by our conscientious objector legislation and
jurisprudence, which moved from a requirement of belief in a Supreme
Being to a much more open ended definition of religious belief.19
19. The Selective Service Act of 1948 provided an exemption for those whose
opposition rested on "religious training and belief," and extended to "participation in war in
any form." Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604, 612 (1948). The statute went on to define its key
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Of course one would still have to define the outer boundaries of
religion, from the outside as it were. I know no better way of
approaching this question than the analogical method elaborated by
Kent Greenawalt, under which it is asked how closely one alleged
religion approximates the features of a religion whose status as such in
our culture is unquestioned.' This is a necessarily multi-factorial and
context-sensitive approach, not reducible to a single criterion or
standard.
My argument is not against making definitions, for we must do that,
but for an attitude of considerable generosity in doing so, coupled with a
somewhat more intense scrutiny of the depth and sincerity of
commitment than is perhaps now usual. The best way for the law to
respect religion is to acknowledge that it cannot understand or represent
it-and thus not to try to do so. Instead, what it can do is to focus upon
the character of individual experience. To return to the analogy of
music, there is no guarantee that any of us in the law will have gifts of
this kind. But we should recognize that others may, and respect those
differences even when we can only dimly perceive them.
This is not a proposal for a new rule of law, or a new method of
analysis, but a suggestion about the attitude the courts might best take
towards these problems. I am saying that in this context the law should
move away from the ideal of clearly articulated standards in the
direction of particular judgments, just as it must in child custody cases,
for example. But here, as elsewhere, when one moves towards the
discretionary, procedural protections become all the more important.
For example, to continue with the conscientious objector cases, and to
restate an argument I made many years ago, the claimant should be able
term by saying that the required belief consisted in an "individual's belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation," but did
not include "essentially political, sociological, or philosophic views or a merely personal
moral code." Id. In United States v. Seeger, the Court held that the language in fact applied
to an objector who denied any belief in a Supreme Being. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The Court
explained in rather tortured language: "A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying
for the exemption comes within the statutory definition." Id at 176. In Welsh v. United
States, the Court extended the language to one who struck out the word "religious" on the
form and said that his views were based on "reading in the fields of history and sociology."
398 U.S. 333, 337 (1970). The Court said, "That section exempts from military service all
those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would
give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become part of an instrument of
war." Id. at 344.
20. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REv.
753,762-76 (1984).
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to make his case on the merits not only to the draft board that classifies
him but also to the judge and jury who are asked to convict him.2' A
judgment of this kind should not be bureaucratized, but left connected
to the world of ordinary language and ordinary experience.
IE.
In all of this it is important to remember that there is nothing
automatically good about religion, which can after all lead to war,
insanity, mutilation, suicide, soul-murder. Nearly every evil that man
has inflicted on man has been done in the name of religion, or under its
influence. Religion is a dimension of life different from the rest of life;
in it some participate more than others, with greater or less intensity, to
ends sometimes of extraordinary beauty, kindness, and wisdom,
sometimes of extraordinary ugliness, cruelty, and folly. What the First
Amendment does, in essence, is to say that we must pay special
attention to this dimension of experience, protecting it in one context,
that of private belief and practice, and limiting it in another, that of
official participation in ecclesiastical or theological life.
What I have said so far about the difficulty of talking about religion
in the language of the law relates mainly to the free exercise of religion.
With respect to the establishment of religion I want to trace out quite a
different line of thought about the difficulty-the impossibility, really-
of talking about religion in the law.
It is important to note to begin with that the question here is very
different: it is not what religious language means to an individual who is
committed to it, but what it means to the rest of us. When the
government puts "In God We Trust" on our money, for example, there
is no person using religious language to express a side of his experience
that is ineffable and which we should struggle to understand, or for
which we should express respect even though-perhaps partly
because-we do not understand it. The question rather is what this
language means to the rest of us, as a public act or symbol.
The particular issue I want to address is how we should think about
the vestiges of Christian or nondenominational theistic establishment
present in our constitutional practice and either approved or ignored by
the Court: "In God We Trust" on our money, legislative chaplains, the
use of the Bible for oaths of office (including the highest in the land),
21. See generally James Boyd White, Processing Conscientious Objector Cases: A
Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1968).
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regular protestations of religious belief by politicians in office, theistic
language in Thanksgiving Proclamations, prayers as part of Presidential
Inaugural addresses, and so forth. There seem to be essentially three
views on these: (1) that they are all right because they are vestigial and
without real religious significance; (2) that they are bad because they
promote or espouse religion; (3) and that they are good because they
acknowledge that we are at bottom a religious people.' Some of these
practices plainly have traditional roots that go back to the founding
generation, and, some say, who are we to disapprove what they
approved?
The question at present arises in two forms: Whether to approve or
disapprove these established practices, and whether to approve or
disapprove their extension. On one view they are not to be tolerated;
on another, tolerated but not extended; on still another they stand as
precedential authority justifying new practices of a similar kind.
One's judgment about the continuing authority of early practices is
complicated by the fact to which I referred earlier, namely that at the
founding "religion" meant, for the most part, the Christian religion or
some set of Christian religions. Of course it no longer has such
restrictive significance but includes, like Gibbon's Rome, religions from
around the world. What this means is that one can now object to the
official manifestations of religion I describe above not only on the
grounds that they establish religion, but on the grounds that they prefer
one religion over others, which almost everyone agrees is impermissible.
The practices I mean, then, are properly controversial not only because
they establish but because they prefer. This fact is normally elided by
the Court, and by the legislatures, who try to use nondenominational
language, call on Rabbis to give commencement prayers, and so forth,
but this I think must fool very few people.
My question is this: If these elements of our public life have hung on
from an earlier more fully Christianized sense of the meaning of
"religion," and of our country, how are we in the law properly to regard
this fact? My own instinct has been to regard them as wrong,
inconsistent with the modern understanding of the secular state, and to
think that the only barriers to their proper judicial removal are political
necessity and the doctrine of standing. This instinct is based both on the
sense that these vestiges of Christianity injure those of other faiths and
22. For a full discussion of competing positions in the context of Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984), see generally WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS
EXTRA: RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1994).
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backgrounds and, more personally, the sense that they vulgarize religion
in general, my religion in particular. But as I have thought about it
more, I have become much less sure of that position. To explain why, I
would like to approach this question by seeing it as an aspect of an even
larger one, equally difficult and sensitive, which is how we should regard
the past of this country more generally: as having what authority, what
claims upon us, and why?
This issue of course arises in many different contexts. One familiar
to all of us has to do with the burden of past human slavery. What does
that mean for us today? I have heard people try to disown the past, with
an argument like this: "If someone's ancestors were here, and owned
slaves, or approved slavery, or did not try to stop it, or acquiesced in it
as part of the constitutional settlement, then maybe they are implicated
in it, and perhaps they should bear a cost, in the form of money or lost
opportunity, in a general social effort to remedy the consequences of
that grave social wrong. But if my ancestors were not here, if I or my
parents came only much later on, and if I have my self neither owned
slaves or approved of racial discrimination, then I have no such burden,
and should pay no price." What does one say to such an argument?
First, and most obviously, any white person in some sense "benefits"
from the racial system even if he had nothing to do with making it and
even if he loathes it, including its supposed benefits; for, whether he
likes it or not, he has powers by virtue of his race that are denied to
others-the power to insult, the power to join with whites in economic
or social solidarity, and, perhaps most important of all, the power to
forget that he has a race. So he too is implicated in the history of race
and slavery, and in my view at least cannot properly disown that past.
For present purposes it is more interesting to ask about the person
who is here assumed to have inherited a burden of guilt. Why should he
be responsible for what his ancestors did, or what the community in
which his ancestors were present did? It is unfair to blame one person
for the acts of another, after all. But I think there is a complex
psychological reality that may justify such a sense of inherited
responsibility: People are proud of what their ancestors did-proud to
be descended from John Adams, say, or Charlemagne-and why should
they not be properly ashamed at their connection to Benedict Arnold,
say, or John Wilkes Booth, or a slave-owning family? And this kind of
feeling is not dependent on familial relations. To think of it at the level
of the nation as a whole, are not most of us proud to be part of a country
that based its existence on the Declaration of Independence, that
created constitutional government, that fought World War II, and so
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on? And if we are proud of these things, are we not right to be ashamed
of others? What is true of a person whose actual ancestors did good or
bad things is in a way true of the rest of us too, for the connection in
both cases is really imaginative, a way of identifying with the past of a
community of which we are members. Whether we grew up in or later
joined a community, we cannot properly select the parts of its history in
which we are imaginatively implicated, choosing what we like and
discarding what we dislike; we should regard ourselves as living both
with what we admire and with what we detest about the world we now
belong to. When we join a nation that has a burden of guilt we assume
that burden, as we assume what we admire. This is obvious I think in
the case of war reparations of a formal kind, or any other national debt.
One could in fact say that our national obligation to respond to the
wrong of human slavery is a kind of war reparation or debt, to which all
of us are bound.
What does this argument about race have to do with the First
Amendment? The analogy would be this: that one who is born into this
country in the late twentieth century, like one who chooses it, becomes
part of a nation with a particular past that he should not simply disown.
In America that past is made especially authoritative through our
practice of building our life upon an ancient Constitution. This
Constitution originally had provisions prohibiting the establishment of
religion that were thought not inconsistent with various ceremonial
involvements of the state with a kind of non-denominational
Christianity. If these practices were initiated today, they would be
widely and properly regarded offensive to the First Amendment.
Should they nonetheless, for the sake of that past, be tolerated?
One possibility is to say that the conditions that made these practices
tolerable have simply changed, and that they are no longer acceptable.
"Let us discard this element of the past and build on our own values and
our own perceptions," we say. But how much of the past will we thus
discard? If we are to be thorough-going "presentists," and say that in
nothing has the past any authority, or any claim upon us, that in nothing
is it the source of pride or shame, that we should simply build our own
world our own way, we may at least have the virtue of theoretical
consistency. But if we try this, in practice we shall find that we must live
with and employ the materials of the past, even in the language with
which we imagine the present and the future. There is in my view no
way to escape the issue of the authority of the past, its institutions and
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its languages.2'
If one is less radical in one's views, one will try to select what one
admires and approves, and reject the rest. Given a sufficiently complex
sense of who the person is that is doing these things, how they should be
done, what is meant by approval and admiration, and so on, this is of
course a standard view, and I approve it myself, for we do want to
disown human slavery, for example, and other basic injustices of the
past. But there remains the question: How confidently or easily can we
take apart the past in this way, separating elements that belong
together?
Let me give a single example of what I mean. There is nothing that I
would hold to more dearly in our past than the language of the
Declaration of Independence, "all men are created equal."'24 As
Abraham Lincoln argued, this is in an important sense the foundation of
our Constitution. The circumstance that the social facts of our world,
then and now, are hideously inconsistent with this promise or ideal
simply make it all the more important. Yet upon what does this value of
equality rest? Is it self-evident? Certainly not, and one may find
oneself in deep trouble trying to rest it upon independent philosophical
foundations. As a factual statement it is obviously not true, and cannot
be true; as a matter of value no one thinks that we ought to equalize
every aspect of life.' So what can it mean? The answer to this question
depends upon another: Upon what does this claim of equality rest, and
what does it mean?
In the context in which it was written a part of the answer lies in its
verb "created." This word at once implies a Creator and connects the
sentence with the opening of Genesis, thus giving it some of the status of
a sacred text. The significance of the presence of the Creator, here
implied and in the next sentence express-"endowed by their
Creator"-is that it gives a narrative explanation for the value of
equality: We are all created, after all, none of us self-born, and we owe
our existence to that which lies beyond us. This Creator, it is implied,
has towards us the attitudes natural to a creator, or a parent, those of
love and caring; and he values us, as a parent values his children,
equally. The fact that you or I may not believe this to be true as a
23. For further discussion see JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING
AUTHORITY IN LAW, LITERATURE, AND POLITICS, especially at 303-07 (1994).
24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
25. See generally PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
RHETORICAL FORCE OF "EQUALITY" IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990).
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
matter of theology is irrelevant to my point; the old language of
theology gives a significance and a coherence to the language of equality
that it otherwise would lack. Like any piece of language, it derives its
meaning from a cultural context, and one that is at least widely theist
and for the most part Christian-a context for example that enabled
Tom Paine to make the claim that every man is a new Adam.26
The force of this has been brought home to me in the course of work
I have done in a seminar on translating and learning foreign law. I
require the students to have a foreign language within their command,
and in an early assignment meant to explore the nature of language and
translation I ask them to translate the phrase, "all men are created
equal," into their language and to explain what happens when they do
so. And what happens is astonishing. In many languages and cultures
this clause makes absolutely no sense, either as a matter of fact or of
value; in others it has resonances that are deeply surprising. One
person, for example, translated it into Arabic and then discovered that
what she had written was one of the sayings of the Prophet and had the
force and significance of his authority. What makes it work for us in
America, simultaneously as an ideal and as a paradox, is its relation to
the culture in which it was written, and this is partly a theistic one.
All this means that what many of us-including some who are not at
all theologically minded, or in any way Christian-most value and
admire and want to preserve in our past may be connected in important
ways to theistic or Christian views that we would otherwise want the
State to reject or get rid of. Is it perhaps the wisest and best course to
tolerate, even to value, the vestiges of ceremonial theism, not as
statements of currently existing belief, but as acknowledgments of the
past in which much of what we most value took its life? It may still be
very useful for us to have the implied narrative of creation to give
definition and standing to the great phrase, and similar arguments could
26. See THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 42 (Dutton, Everyman's Library ed.
1958).
Every history of the creation, and every traditionary account, whether from the
lettered or unlettered world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of
certain particulars, all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man; by which I
mean that men are all of one degree, and consequently that all men are born equal,
and with equal natural rights, in the same manner as if posterity had been continued
by creation instead of generation, the latter being only the mode by which the former
is carried forward; and consequently every child born into the world must be
considered as deriving its existence from God. The world is as new to him as it was
to the first man that existed, and his natural right in it is of the same kind.
[Vol. 81:177
TALKING ABOUT RELIGION
be made about other parts of our tradition. To remit ourselves entirely
to the language of twentieth century political philosophy would I think
involve a great loss of power and significance in a language that we
value.
Such a view as I suggest would lead to the approval only of the
existing vestiges of a formerly acceptable establishment, not to their
extension by analogy. Legislative chaplains, Bibles at inaugurations, "In
God We Trust," Thanksgiving Proclamations, and Presidential prayers
would be seen as parts of a heritage, connected to other parts that have
current value and vitality. I am painfully aware that such a formulation
does not decide hard cases, such as prayers at high school graduation,
state university support for religious clubs and publications, the
provision of various forms of aid to religious schools, and the like. But
my aim at the moment is not so much to work out a rule of decision as
to render problematic the instinct with which I began, that the right
thing is a clean sweep of all vestiges of religion with a puritanical broom.
One other factor perhaps deserves mention. In the past two
hundred years America has become much more religiously diverse, and
in ways that make ceremonial Christianity more problematic than it was.
But I am not sure that it has become less religious, or even less
Christian. Suppose a new constitutional convention were to be held in
1999, in Dallas, and the question were debated whether the religion
clauses should be revised to permit prayer in schools, for example, or to
declare that this is a Christian nation. I am not at all sure that the
antiestablishment forces would prevail. In other words, the common
view that America has become a more religiously tolerant nation as it
has become more diverse may not be accurate. This in turn means that
to maintain what I have called the vestiges of establishment may not be
to carry into the present era more establishment than it would choose
on its own, but less. In thinking about the authority of the past, the
most rigorous anti-establishmentarian should perhaps consider that the
legacy we have, including its ceremonial element, may be working to
protect, not injure, his values.
I should of course acknowledge that in making this suggestion I am
specially situated, since I am in a general way a member of the religious
community whose vestiges I am saying we might tolerate. "Easy for you
to say," someone might understandably respond, perhaps going on to
say that I should be disqualified for interest, and there is much in such a
position. Of course it is true that I may be led by familiarity or desire
into accepting what I ought not accept. But it also happens to be true
that I intensely dislike the kinds of prayers and other symbols I am
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speaking of, in large part because they seem to me to depreciate
religion, reducing it to the empty and the sentimental. So far as I am
aware I do not draw any inner comfort from legislative prayers, any
more than I do from Presidential prayer breakfasts, the work of
television evangelists, the invocation of religious grounds for legislation,
and the like. But I do think we should tolerate these things.
IV.
I have talked a lot about religion, rather little about the judicial
process. How does what I have said relate to that? Not in any direct or
automatic way: To think of the topics to be addressed at this
conference, for example, nothing I have said would lead me to say that a
judge ought (or ought not) to feel free to base a judgment on a religious
view, ought (or ought not) to recuse herself from a case in which her
religious views were implicated, or that a senator ought (or ought not)
to feel free to oppose a candidate for the judiciary on religious grounds.
What I do think is that the depth and inherent inexpressibility of
religious experience makes it very hard for a person to separate the
religious from the non-religious in her life. This means that it would be
difficult for me as a judge to say that a particular position was or was not
based on religious grounds. In my experience religion works so close to
the center of the personality that it is hard to be confident of any such
judgment. Likewise with respect to recusal on such a ground, though in
clear cases a member of a particular religious community ought not to
decide a case to which it is a party.27 With respect to opposition to a
judicial candidate on religious grounds, the question seems to me largely
or exclusively political, and here I would regard it as highly undesirable
to begin, or to make explicit, a conversation which has in it sentences
like: "I am opposed to (or in favor of) him because he is a Catholic; or a
Jew; or an Evangelical Christian."
V.
My object has been not to propose rules of decision, but to speak to
the deeper question of appropriate judicial attitude. In the first part of
my remarks, dealing with free exercise, my idea has been to try to find a
way of respecting the experience of others, or of other parts of
27. The difficulty here lies in defining the boundaries of the community. As a Catholic
from St. Mary's parish, I ought not decide a suit against that parish and maybe not a suit
against the Catholic church. But what about a suit against another denomination? It is hard
to know who would decide religious cases if recusal were required in such an instance.
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ourselves, even though-or especially because-it cannot be translated
into our common language. In the second part, I have tried to find a
way of respecting the way in which our own patterns of thought and
value, as reflected in that common language, are partly shaped by
elements in our culture that we would now be inclined to resist. I am
trying, that is, to imagine both religious experience and our past in ways
that enable us to respect them, despite--or because of-the way they do
not fit the premises of our contemporary public discourse.
There is of course a tension between these positions, for the first
leads to a very generous definition of belief, which would tend to make
the ceremonial vestiges of the second part seem less vestigial and more
problematic. I accept this fact, but invoke as authority for tolerating it
the first amendment itself, the great achievement of which is the
profound tension, indeed paradox, between its religion clauses.' I think
we can read it not as committing us to a single value, or coherent set of
values, but to something more important, a struggle between two values,
both of them crucial, neither of which can be accommodated perfectly,
both of which acquire definition partly from their relation to the other.
Despite all the difficulties I referred to at the beginning of this talk, the
first amendment has the great merit of insisting simultaneously upon the
importance of religion and its danger, and it does so in such a way as to
make it impossible to theorize away the tension it identifies. Think how
different our world would be, for example, if there were simply no law,
or no constitutional law, about religion, from either point of view; or if
the Constitution contained only one of its two clauses.
The First Amendment also insists upon another tension, that
between the language of religion and the language of the law. I asked
earlier whether different modes of discourse can inhabit the same mind,
the same polity. I think that they can, but only if it is understood that
we cannot successfully insist that either make sense in terms of the
other. Indeed I think that it is a great thing for the person as well as the
polity, that it have distinct resources of life and meaning that cannot be
reduced to each other.
What the amendment calls for in the end is not a set of
generalizations that will harmonize the inconsistencies between its two
religion clauses, or those between law and religion more generally, but a
set of attitudes that will enable us to face and live with the problem it
insists upon putting before us, the impossible but necessary task of
28. For an elaboration of the paradoxical nature of the First Amendment Religion
Clauses, see Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. Cr. REv. 123.
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talking about religion in the language of the law. To return to the
passage from Gibbon with which I began, our hope at the end might be
that we could achieve a condition of "religious concord" based not, like
the Roman one upon contempt, credulity, or cynicism, but upon respect.
